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Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives:
Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Efficiency
Louis Kaplowt
The view that intergenerational distributive justice and efficiency should be
treated separately is familiar, yet controversial. This Article elaborates the often-implicit
justifications for separate treatment and provides a more express statement of how and
when such treatment is appropriate. Substantial attention is devoted to an approach that
holds constant the intra- and intergenerational distribution of well-being, which proves
to be a valuable analytical device even for intergenerational policies that are not distri-
bution neutral. Also explored are possible interrelationships between intergenerational
distributive justice and efficiency, the choice of interest rate for discounting dollars, and
how the present approach relates to those that would employ direct social weights to
dollars at different points in time.
I. INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this Article is that questions of intergenerational
distributive justice and of intergenerational efficiency are substantially
distinct in principle. A pure issue of intergenerational distributive jus-
tice would be presented in a simple, hypothetical world, in which the
only decision with intergenerational consequences concerned the rate
of use of a single resource: more for any one generation would entail
less for another. The argument here is that, however that sort of allo-
cation should ideally be made or is in fact determined, all further con-
sideration of intergenerational dimensions of policies- whether in-
volving the environment, infrastructure, research and development,
education, or social security -dissolves almost entirely into matters of
efficiency.' This claim does not entail that the remaining efficiency
t Finn M.W. Caspersen and Household International Professor of Law and Economics,
Harvard Law School and National Bureau of Economic Research. I am grateful to Eric Posner
and conference participants for comments; Ryan Copus, Jonathan Lin, Robert Lutzker, and Elisa
Poncz for research assistance; and the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at
Harvard University for financial support. The central idea in this Article first emerged as part of
a 1995 draft (that received only limited circulation) for a book project that has become The
Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (Princeton forthcoming); that idea and much of the
elaboration draws from the current book manuscript as well as from other articles on the rela-
tionship between distribution and efficiency in various settings.
1 The question of population size is distinct, but note that it may arise even in the simple
world in which there is only one resource to allocate over time. Additionally, population size
issues might be classified as intragenerational in nature. In any event, population size will not be
considered further here.
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questions are straightforward or uncontroversial. It does imply that
they are essentially the same questions that arise when considering
policies whose impact is confined to a single generation.
Part of this claim may be restated using the rubric of discounting.
Whether lives-or, more broadly, utility-in different generations
should be discounted is one way to define some positions in debates
about intergenerational distributive justice.2 From the welfarist per-
spective generally followed here-under which social welfare is taken
to be solely a function of individuals' well-being-a discount rate (in-
cluding a zero rate) may be employed in specifying the social welfare
function that aggregates the well-being of individuals in different gen-
erations.3 Different discount rates on utility in this setting correspond
2 Some favor the discounting of utility or lives to avoid imposing what are perceived as
excessive savings obligations on earlier generations One strand of such work builds on R Ram-
sey, A Mathematical Theory of Saving, 38 Econ J 543 (1928), which presents a model where early
generations' savings rates should be very high. See, for example, K.J. Arrow, et al, Intertemporal
Equity, Discounting, and Economic Efficiency, in James P Bruce, Hoesung Lee, and Erik F
Haites, eds, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change 125, 137
(Cambridge 1996); Kenneth J. Arrow, Discounting, Morality, and Gaming, in Paul R. Portney and
John P. Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 13 (Resources for the Future
1999). Additionally, in some models a zero discount rate over an infinite horizon leads to conun-
drums, such as no consumption of exhaustible resources ever being permitted (when such re-
sources are the only source of consumption). See, for example, Geoffrey M. Heal, The Optimal
Use of Exhaustible Resources, in Allen V. Kneese and James L. Sweeney, eds, 3 Handbook of
Natural Resource and Energy Economics 855, 868-78 (Elsevier 1993). In any event, a range of
scholars (including Ramsey) have opposed any discounting of utility, the most commonly cited
reason being that it violates equal treatment (although some would nevertheless impose limits
on the sacrifice required of early generations if a pure no-discounting approach required great
sacrifice). See, for example, John Broome, Counting the Cost of Global Warming 52-112 (White
Horse 1992); Tyler Cowen, Consequentialism Implies a Zero Rate of Intergenerational Discount,
in Peter Laslett and James S. Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups and Generations 162 (Yale
1992); Tyler Cowen and Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Laslett and Fishkin,
eds, Justice Between Age Groups 144; Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons 480-86 (Oxford 1984);
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysi , and the Discounting of
Human Lives, 99 Colum L Rev 941 (1999); and Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (Chicago
7th ed 1907). Interestingly, Rawls, although arguing from an original position, does not reach this
conclusion, in part because he stipulates that only a single generation is taken to be behind the
veil of ignorance (even though that generation is ignorant of which generation it is). See John
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284-98 (Harvard 1971). This approach has been criticized. See, for
example, Brian Barry, Theories of Justice 189-203 (California 1989); B.M. Barry, Justice Between
Generations, in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz, eds, Law, Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of
H.L.A. Hart 268 (Oxford 1977). A revised view is presented in John Rawls, Political Liberalism
274 (Columbia 1993). For a libertarian approach that would impose more limited obligations on
present generations, see David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford 1986). For collections of
views, see Laslett and Fishkin, eds, Justice Between Age Groups, and Portney and Weyant, eds,
Discounting and Intergenerational Equity.
3 Although much of the analysis will be explicitly welfarist, many of the ideas are applica-
ble to a variety of non-welfarist theories for the reasons suggested in the conclusion. For con-
trasting views on welfarism, see, for example, Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitari-
anism and Beyond (Cambridge 1982). For a defense, see, for example, R.M. Hare, Moral Think-
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to different views of the appropriate social weight on different genera-
tions. By contrast, whether and how dollars in different generations
should be discounted is often viewed as a question of efficiency. An
implication of the present view, as will be seen, is that efficiency does
require discounting dollars-and, in particular, at the market rate of
return to capital-and that this is true independently of whether and
how lives should be discounted. Note that, since this conclusion does
not depend on the appropriate rate of discount on lives, it is possible a
priori that either of the two discount rates could be higher.
The view that distribution and efficiency should be separated in
the intergenerational context is hardly novel. Yet adherents largely
take its validity for granted while others reject it. The purpose of the
present investigation is to analyze more precisely the foundation for
the position.' This effort should generate greater acceptance and lead
to a better appreciation of the broad applications of the proposed
framework. In any event, a more explicit articulation of justifications
also serves to expose the underlying premises more sharply, which
should enhance understanding of pertinent qualifications as well as
provide a more focused target for those who might disagree.
A number of perspectives on intergenerational efficiency are de-
veloped in Part II. First, it is suggested that standard methods of cost-
benefit analysis within generations combined with ordinary discount-
ing of returns to capital between generations validate the use of dollar
discounting for all intergenerational policy decisions. (How this en-
compassing conclusion can be fully reconciled with a wide range of
views on intergenerational distributive justice will be explained.) Sec-
ond, deviations from this approach are shown to be inefficient; specifi-
ing: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford 1981), and Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Fairness
Versus Welfare (Harvard 2002).
4 See, for example, Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 125 (cited in note 2); David F.
Bradford, On the Uses of Benefit-Cost Reasoning in Choosing Policy toward Global Climate
Change, in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 37 (cited in note
2); John Broome, Discounting the Future, 23 Phil & Pub Aff 128 (1994); Charles D. Kolstad and
Jeffrey A. Krautkraemer, Natural Resource Use and the Environment, in Kneese and Sweeney,
eds, Handbook of Natural Resource 1219 (cited in note 2); Robert C. Lind, A Primer on the Ma-
jor Issues Relating to the Discount Rate for Evaluating National Energy Options, in Robert C.
Lind, et al, Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy 21 (Resources for the Future 1982);
Revesz, 99 Colum L Rev 941 (cited in note 2); W. Kip Viscusi, Discounting Health Effects for
Medical Decisions, in Frank A. Sloan, ed, Valuing Health Care: Costs Benefits and Effectiveness
of Pharmaceuticals and Other Medical Technologies 125 (Cambridge 1995); Martin L. Weitzman,
"Just Keep Discounting, But... ," in Portney and Weyant, eds, Discounting and Intergenerational
Equity 23 (cited in note 2).
5 See also Dexter Samida and David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting,
74 U Chi L Rev 145 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory
Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational Equity, 74 U Chi L Rev 171 (2007); W. Kip Viscusi,
Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U Chi L Rev 209 (2007).
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cally, policies in violation can be modified in the stipulated direction
so as to make all generations better off. Third, it is explained that fu-
ture generations permitted to make allocative choices for the present
generation regarding actions with intergenerational effects would
choose policies entirely on grounds of efficiency.
Each of the foregoing three perspectives is somewhat loose, in-
cluding with regard to questions of intragenerational distribution that
may be affected by intergenerational decisions. The fourth argument
in this Part treats all distributive concerns more directly. Specifically, it
is described how more efficient policies may be implemented in a man-
ner that is distribution neutral both within each generation and among
all generations. When distribution is held constant, matters of (intra-
and intergenerational) distributive justice are moot. Greater efficiency
can be to the benefit of every individual in every generation. Exten-
sions of and qualifications to this argument are also considered.
Possible relationships between intergenerational distributive jus-
tice and efficiency are explored in Part III. First, just as in the intragen-
erational setting, which policies are efficient may depend on the distri-
bution of resources. Second, private intergenerational transfers and
liquidity constraints may alter the effects of government intergenera-
tional transfers. Third, the possibility that future generations may be
systematically richer (or poorer) is examined. Although each consid-
eration complicates the determination of optimal intergenerational
policy, the conclusion from Part II remains intact.
Because of its centrality to the analysis of intergenerational effi-
ciency, the market interest rate on capital is examined in Part IV. Fac-
tors considered are: uncertainty in government and private projects
and about the interest rate, capital taxation, and endogeneity of the
market interest rate. It is noted that, just as with many of the other
complications considered in this Article, the issues are not distinctively
intergenerational. That is, they would arise in a world with only one
generation (the lives of which span some period of time), and their
resolution for intergenerational purposes should be no different from
when the problem is viewed within a single generation. One way to put
this point is that a dollar invested, in whatever manner, over a period of
time does not know or care whether it is an intragenerational dollar
(part of someone's lifecycle savings) or an intergenerational dollar.
In Part V, the approach to discounting dollars of using a market in-
terest rate (with appropriate adjustments) is contrasted with the often-
advanced alternative of making explicit reference to social weightings
of dollars in different time periods. This comparison serves to highlight
the interrelationships among the arguments in earlier parts of the Arti-
cle. Concluding remarks are offered in Part VI. The discussion returns
to the core question of distribution versus efficiency in the intergen-
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erational context and offers some comments concerning why demon-
strations from the welfarist perspective should be seen as persuasive
from a number of non-welfarist positions.
II. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
A. Valuing Utility, Discounting Lives
Suppose that one wishes to compare the relative merits of poli-
cies that differentially affect individuals' well-being in the present and
in the future. The claim in this section is that one can (1) convert fu-
ture utility into future dollars using standard principles of valuation,
then (2) transform future dollars into present dollars by discounting at
the market rate of return on capital, and finally (3) convert present
dollars into present utility using standard principles of valuation. Al-
though this approach (and that in sections B and C) has been sug-
gested previously,6 it is useful to elaborate on its rationale.
For example, consider the construction from scratch of a new ur-
ban transit system involving an elaborate system of tunnels that will
take a generation to complete. Costs, both financial and nonpecuniary
(such as disruption), will be incurred in the present generation, whereas
much of the benefits will accrue to future generations. Using the afore-
mentioned technique, future benefits can be valued in dollars and dis-
counted to present value to compare with the costs. Everything could
be considered in present dollars (converting present nonpecuniary costs
into dollars), as is often done, or everything could be evaluated in pre-
sent utility. As long as a single common denominator is used and consis-
tent conversion rates are employed, the result will be the same
The basis for this procedure is straightforward. Steps (1) and (3)
each involve conversions between utility and dollars within a time
period (generation).8 Standard cost-benefit principles govern how
these conversions are properly made. As long as the appropriate
method is employed, these steps are justified. (Note that the methods
6 See note 4.
7 Suppose that, in present dollars, costs are C and benefits B; the project passes a cost-
benefit test if B > C. If present dollars convert to present utility at the rate a, then in terms of pre-
sent utility costs are aC and benefits are aB, so the test is whether aB > aC, which is the same test.
8 The text speaks of the conversion of utility into dollars, whereas it is often common to
speak of the conversion of lives into dollars, under the rubric of the value of a statistical life
(VSL). With regard to some environmental issues and other matters (for example, medical re-
search), future statistical lives are indeed an important part of what is at stake. Furthermore,
regarding distributive justice, it is more common to refer to discounting lives than utility. Never-
theless, influencing risks to life are but one way that policies may influence utility, and the meth-
ods of determining VSL are utility-based in any event, so it is more useful to speak in terms of
the more encompassing notion of utility.
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are qualitatively the same in each period, even though the conversion
ratios could differ for various reasons, as will be noted below.)
Step (2) is a pure transformation of dollars between time periods.
Whatever discount rate is appropriate for such purposes-which will
be the same as the discount rate that is used to assess an ordinary
capital project whose cost is entirely in present dollars and whose
benefit is entirely in future dollars-should be employed here. Dis-
counting dollars is justified because the market discount rate is a price
that signifies resource costs just like any other price, such as the price
for steel, concrete, or other inputs for the project.
It follows, therefore, that since each step in the proposed method
for the assessment of intergenerational projects is independently valid,
the entire procedure is valid. Notice furthermore that each of the
steps is justified independently of any special consideration of the int-
ergenerational setting. Steps (1) and (3) are explicitly intragenera-
tional because each operates within a single time period. Step (2) is
intertemporal, but it need not be intergenerational. That is, the same
reasoning applies to a project undertaken by individuals when they are
young that is for their own benefit when they are old. (Recall the refer-
ence in the introduction to lifecycle savings, such as for retirement.)
What about distributive concerns? Steps (1) and (3) involve in-
tragenerational distribution, familiar from the debate about whether
distributive weights should be employed in cost-benefit analysis.9
There is a strong presumption against using distributive weights be-
cause any redistribution is best undertaken (or offset) through the
income tax,' a view that will be elaborated more explicitly in sections
D and E. At this point, however, it is sufficient to note that, if one does
accept the appropriateness of distributive weighting, then those
weights should be employed in steps (1) and (3) and the procedure
9 See, for example, Burton A. Weisbrod, Income Redistribution Effects and Benefit-Cost
Analysis, in Samuel B. Chase, Jr., ed, Problems in Public Expenditure Analysis 177 (Brookings
1968); and the survey by Jean Dr~ze and Nicholas Stem, The Theory of Cost-Benefit Analysis, in
Alan J. Auerbach and Martin Feldstein, eds, 2 Handbook of Public Economics 909 (North-
Holland 1987). Arrow and coauthors state that, in addition to aggregate economic benefits and
costs, "equity within and across generations" may sometimes be important and that "a good
analysis will also identify important distributional consequences"; nevertheless, they also state
that "environmental, health, and safety regulations are neither effective nor efficient tools for
achieving redistributional goals." Kenneth J. Arrow, et a], Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analy-
sis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, Science 221,222 (April 12, 1996).
t0 This argument is first developed in Aanund Hylland and Richard Zeckhauser, Distribu-
tional Objectives Should Affect Taxes but Not Program Choice or Design, 81 Scandinavian J Econ
264 (1979). It is applied explicitly to legal rules in Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vx Distri-
butional Equity in Legal Rulemaking: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal In-
come Taxation?, 71 Am Econ Rev 414 (1981), and Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Why the
Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J Legal Stud 667
(1994). See also the sources cited in note 12.
[74:79
Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives
would be valid. Keep in mind that this distributive weighting is only
concerned with intragenerational distributive justice.
Step (2), by contrast, does potentially raise questions about inter-
generational distribution. Specifically, if costs and benefits are not al-
located across generations in the same proportions, then the discount-
ing in step (2) might be questioned as ignoring distribution by equat-
ing present and market-discounted future dollars. The efficiency point
still stands, however, if one compares projects with a similar intergen-
erational distributive incidence or in other ways holds intergenera-
tional distribution constant, as will be done explicitly in the sections
that follow. (Furthermore, Parts III and IV will discuss how both in-
tragenerational valuations and the market discount rate already re-
flect the intergenerational distribution that prevails.)
B. Efficient Tradeoffs
Policies in violation of the aforementioned cost-benefit approach,
which combines intragenerational dollar valuation of utility and inter-
generational discounting of dollars, can be modified to reduce the ex-
tent of deviation in a manner that benefits all pertinent generations.
Suppose, for example, that the proposed transit project is to be under-
taken on a smaller scale than indicated by the three-step cost-benefit
test. (The analysis for a project undertaken to excess would be the
same, mutatis mutandis, and thus will not be considered separately.)
It is useful to state more precisely what this description implies.
Suppose that the cost of an incremental increase in the scale of the
project to the present generation, converted into present dollars, is C ,
and that the benefit of this modification to the future generation, in
future dollars, is Bf. Furthermore, let R denote the return on capital
between the relevant time periods; that is, one dollar invested in an
ordinary (marginal) capital investment in the present yields 1 + R dol-
lars in the future. Therefore, the statement that the project expansion
would pass section A's cost-benefit test means that C, < B/(1 + R), or,
equivalently, C(1 + R) < Bf. (In the former inequality, B/(1 + R) is the
future benefit, in future dollars, discounted to present dollars; in the
latter inequality, Cp(1 + R) is the present cost, in present dollars, con-
verted to future dollars.)
Consider now a reform that expands the transit project in the
manner just described and simultaneously contracts an ordinary capi-
tal investment that benefits the future generation by an equivalent
amount, C . For the latter, one could imagine anything done on behalf
of the future generation; as just one example, the government could
issue debt in the amount of C, with all accumulated interest and the
original principal to be paid off by the future generation. The future
generation will thus have to sacrifice an additional C(1 + R) to cover
20071
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the forgone investment or debt. However, it was stipulated that its
benefit from the project, Bf, is greater than C (1 + R), so the future
generation is better off. The present generation breaks even: it pays C
for the project expansion but saves C, from the other financial ad-
justment. Hence, the future generation is better off and the present
generation is no worse off.
Obviously, one could also share the net benefit between the two
generations. For example, the latter adjustment (forgone investment
or increased present generation debt) could be raised from C to
C, + [B1(1 + R) - C]. The term in brackets is the net efficiency gain
from the project expansion, evaluated in present dollars. With this ad-
justment, each generation is better off by half of that amount. Hence,
as asserted at the outset, if there is any deviation from the three-step
test outlined in section A, it is possible to move in the direction indi-
cated by that procedure in a manner that benefits all affected genera-
tions. In this case, the intergenerational distribution is indeed held
constant, providing a clear justification for relying purely on an effi-
ciency test. H
C. A Future Generation's Preferred Choices for a Present
Generation's Allocations
Suppose that some overall allocation between the present gen-
eration and a future generation has been selected. (The analysis to
follow does not depend on whether this choice accords with any par-
ticular theory of intergenerational distributive justice.) One can imag-
ine that whatever amount is to be invested on behalf of the future
generation is placed in a segregated pool, a trust of sorts, and that a
guardian who will faithfully carry out the will of the future generation
has complete authority regarding how the pool is to be invested. The
claim in this section is that the guardian, seeking to maximize the
overall well-being of the future generation, will be guided solely by
considerations of intergenerational efficiency, consistent with the con-
clusion of the preceding two sections.
Possible investments for this pool include ordinary private capital
investments (for example, machines), improvements to infrastructure,
research and development, education of the young who will become
the adults of the future generation, environmental protection, re-
source conservation, building government institutions (including en-
hanced future security through defense or foreign aid), and fostering
11 As noted in section A, there are also intragenerational distributive issues, but they may
be addressed either separately or through using distributive weights in valuing the costs and
benefits within each generation.
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institutions and activities that will favorably influence social norms. In
addition, there would be pure financial claims, such as the extent to
which social security is prefunded (versus pay-as-you-go) and the
magnitude of government debt more broadly. The guardian is author-
ized to expend more resources on any such investments, but each in-
cremental expenditure must be offset by reductions in other invest-
ments: the composition of the investment portfolio, so to speak, may
be freely adjusted, but its total size is fixed.
It is apparent that the guardian, in seeking to maximize the bene-
fit to the future generation, will be guided solely by considerations of
efficiency. Each investment will be pursued to the point at which its
marginal return just equals the market interest rate on capital (in-
vestment in which, in various ways, is one of the choices open to the
guardian). Indeed, the problem is conceptually no different from one
involving purely intragenerational allocation within the time period of
the future generation. Expenditures that must be made in different pe-
riods have different prices -the interest rate, it is well understood, sim-
ply constitutes the market price for one particular input. For example, if
it is cheaper to clean up an environmental problem sooner rather than
later, that is what the guardian would choose, by allocating some of the
pool to environmental protection. However, if it is cheaper to clean up
later, that can be done by allocating resources instead, say, to some
market investment, wherein the future proceeds would be expended
subsequently on cleanup. In choosing between the two alternatives, of
course, the costs would be compared using the market interest rate. (Ei-
ther the present cost would be multiplied by 1 + R to put it in common
terms with the future outlay, or the future outlay would be discounted-
divided by 1 + R-to put it in common terms with the present cost.)
What of distributive concerns? The intergenerational distribution
is held constant under this construct and hence may be ignored. Like-
wise, the present generation's intragenerational distribution is unaf-
fected. Regarding the intragenerational distribution within the future
generation, the same remarks offered in section A apply: that too
might be held constant-for example, through an income tax adjust-
ment, as will be elaborated in section D-or, if thought appropriate,
distributive weights would be employed; that is, they would be em-
ployed regarding the costs and benefits both of projects funded in the
present generation from the pool and of those funded in the future
generation, whether financed by proceeds from investment of the pool
or out of then-current production.
The present perspective implies that it is incomplete and poten-
tially misleading to suggest that the present generation does (or does
not) have an obligation to a future generation to do one specific thing
or another, such as cleaning up the environment, conserving nonre-
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newable resources, or avoiding accumulation of a large debt. As a mat-
ter of intergenerational distributive justice, there may be an obligation
that the pool in question be of a certain size. How it should be allo-
cated, however, is a matter of efficiency. Thus understood, it would
nevertheless be meaningful to state that some particular obligation
exists. The meaning would be that, given the amount of resources that
the current generation is supposed to make available for a future gen-
eration, it would be efficient to spend certain amounts on particular
projects. Hence, the statement of obligation would entail a judgment
about efficiency, itself conditional on a judgment about the intergen-
erational distribution (on which, see Part III.A).
D. Intra- and Intergenerational Distribution Neutrality
The perspectives offered in sections A through C varied in the
explicitness with which they addressed intra- and intergenerational
distribution. It is useful to state more precisely a notion of distribution
neutrality that makes statements about the separation of efficiency
and distribution more rigorous, particularly from an intergenerational
perspective. In addition, it is desirable to have a framework in which
one can identify the role of the income tax, transfers, and other fiscal
instruments pertinent to distributional matters. Accordingly, this sec-
tion explains how the formal analysis that has been previously devel-
oped in the intragenerational context may be interpreted and ex-
tended to encompass intergenerational distribution and efficiency.12
To begin, it is helpful to introduce some notation. Let
U,(y - T.(y,z),z) denote the utility of an individual in generation i
who has consumption of y - T,(y,z) (income y net of taxes and trans-
fers T(y, z), on which more in a moment) when the prevailing regime
is z. We can think of the simple case largely employed above in which
there are two generations, in which case i can equal 1 or 2, or a se-
12 Important precursors are cited in note 10. More formal treatments and further elabora-
tion appear in Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of
Taxation, 49 Natl Tax J 513 (1996); Louis Kaplow, On the (lr)Relevance of Distribution and La-
bor Supply Distortion to Government Policy, 18 J Econ Persp 159 (Fall 2004); Louis Kaplow, On
the Undesirability of Commodity Taxation Even When Income Taxation Is Not Optimal, 90 J Pub
Econ 1235 (2006); Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and the Distribution of Income, 50 Eur Econ Rev
1627 (2006); Louis Kaplow, Optimal Control of Externalities in the Presence of Income Taxation
(National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series No 12339, 2006), online at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12339 (visited Jan 22,2007); Louis Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation
and Public Economics (Princeton forthcoming). Much of the work can be understood as gener-
alizations of and extensions to Atkinson and Stiglitz's seminal paper on optimal income and
commodity taxation (albeit using a different approach). See A.B. Atkinson and J.E. Stiglitz, The
Design of Tax Structure: Direct Versus Indirect Taxation, 6 J Pub Econ 55 (1976). The discussion in
the text presents only a heuristic argument, but one that is highly suggestive of how these previous
analyses can readily be interpreted or slightly extended to make the present statements rigorous.
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quence of discrete generations (there might be n generations, or they
might extend into the indefinite future).3 Individuals' income levels y
may differ, which makes intragenerational as well as intergenerational
distributive questions interesting.14 For the moment, however, incomes
will be taken as given. (Section E.1 will make income endogenous, a
function of individuals' choices of labor effort, which introduces the
issue of distortionary income taxation.) The variable z is taken to repre-
sent a complete depiction of the regime that prevails in all generations.
As noted, T(y,z) denotes the income tax and transfer scheme
applicable in each generation. Note first that this is, indeed, taken to
be a tax and transfer scheme, allowing, for example, net payments to
lower-income individuals (such as through welfare programs) as well
as transfers across generations (that is, it is not required that the gov-
ernment's budget balances in each generation, but only that there is
long-run fiscal balance). Further, in making each generation's tax
schedule a function of the regime z, it is contemplated that different
tax schedules may be employed as part of the shift to another regime.
Let us now consider any reform from an initial regime, z0 , to
some other regime, z*. As a general matter, the utility of individuals in
various generations will change. These changes, in turn, may differ
both across generations (such as when the present generation makes an
investment that benefits a future generation) and within generations
(those at different income levels may gain or lose by different amounts).
Next, consider a specific (although hypothetical) adjustment to
the income tax schedules in each generation, from T(y,z ° ) to
T'(y,z*), such that the utility of every individual is kept constant. That
is, whatever is the effect of the regime shift from z' to z* on the utility,
say, of an individual with income y in generation i, adjust the tax sched-
ule for generation i at income level y in a precisely offsetting manner. If
the individual in question experiences a gain that, when converted to
dollars in that individual's generation, is $100, the individual's taxes
would be raised by $100; if he or she loses by $50, the individual's
taxes would be reduced by $50.5 (Note that these adjustments are
likely, in general, to depend not only on an individual's generation but
13 For some analytical purposes, it is useful to let i be a continuous variable. The present
formulation allows that interpretation as well (although some of the statements to follow may in
that case fail to hold on sets of measure zero, which does not materially alter the conclusions).
14 In formal analysis that employs a continuous distribution of income, one would have, for
example, a density function f,(y) and cumulative distribution function F,(y) for income in each
generation i (with the population of each generation normalized to one). This addition allows
one to take into account how many individuals there are at each income level, which is important
because costs and benefits of projects (regimes) in general vary across the income distribution. "
15 Formally, the tax adjustments may have income effects; however, it is straightforward
how the tax adjustments need to be defined so as to keep utility constant.
2007]
The University of Chicago Law Review
also on an individual's income)." Such adjustments to each generation
i's tax schedule are to be made at every level of income y.
Combining the regime shift from z ° to z* with the income tax
schedule adjustment from T(y,z0) to T'(y,z*), we can now analyze
both the distributive and efficiency consequences of the combined
reform. First, by definition (of the income tax schedule adjustment in
particular), each individual, regardless of generation, has precisely the
same utility before the reform and after. Accordingly, the resulting
distribution of well-being both within each generation and between
any two generations is identical to what it was previously. That is, the
current formulation indeed defines a reform that is intra- and inter-
generationally distribution neutral.
What about the efficiency of the shift in regimes? To determine
this, consider whether the hypothesized tax adjustment, from T(y,z °)
to T'(y,z*), generates a budget surplus or deficit. How much net reve-
nue is raised or lost? The additional tax paid, or reduction received, by
each individual just equals (by construction) the individual's gain or
loss from the change, measured in dollars. If we sum these dollar gains
and losses-and discount them to a common time period using the
market rate of interest-we have a surplus if and only if the conven-
tional cost-benefit test (as modified for intergenerational projects,
following section A) is satisfied. 7 That is, if benefits exceed costs, there
is a surplus by construction, and if costs exceed benefits, there is a
deficit. Hence, efficient reforms generate surpluses, and inefficient
reforms create deficits.
If the reform is efficient, therefore, it is possible to further adjust
each generation's income tax schedule, now from TI'(y,z*) to T.(y,z*),
by rebating surplus pro rata to each individual in each generation until
the point at which the surplus is exhausted.18 Now, the first step of the
reform-the regime change plus the initial, hypothetical tax adjust-
ment-kept every individual's utility constant, and this second step, a
16 Concretely, consider the case in which benefits or costs are additively separable in utility;
that is, the effect of the reform on the utility of individuals in a given generation is the same. To
convert those constant utility benefits into dollars, one must divide by the marginal utility of
consumption. If the utility of consumption is determined, say, by the natural log of consumption,
then the marginal utility of consumption is the inverse of (one over) consumption; hence, an
individual with twice the income has one half the marginal utility and thus twice the dollar bene-
fit associated with a given utility increase. Accordingly, such richer individuals would have their
taxes raised twice as much to offset the benefit of the reform. As will be elaborated in Part III.C,
similar implications arise between generations if some generations are richer than others.
17 Any costs or benefits directly to the government fisc may be added to this total or may
be imputed to the individuals who would otherwise have their tax obligations adjusted to pro-
duce fiscal balance.
18 It is contemplated that the rebates be equal in present value, although nominal equality
or various other allocations would also generate a Pareto improvement.
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pro rata rebate, increases everyone's utility. Hence, every individual in
every generation is made better off. That is, when efficient reforms are
undertaken in a distribution-neutral fashion, it follows that there is an
intra- and intergenerational Pareto improvement.
Similar analysis applies to inefficient reforms, which produce defi-
cits. Obviously, if the deficit is financed by a pro rata tax increase, every
individual in every generation is made worse off. Consider, however, a
reform in the opposite direction, for example, shrinking rather than
expanding the contemplated project. If expansion failed the cost-benefit
test, generating a deficit, then a contraction will generate a surplus-
that is, will be efficient and permit a Pareto improvement, as just de-
scribed. The exception is when neither expansion nor contraction creates
a surplus, which typically holds when (at the margin) costs just equal
benefits, the standard criterion for a project that is of optimal size.19
The foregoing analysis shows more precisely the manner in which
regimes may be changed in a manner that is distribution neutral-
both intra- or intergenerationally-in which case all policies (other
than purely redistributive ones, see section E.3) are properly assessed
purely in terms of efficiency. This procedure can be seen as underlying
the more informal statements in sections A though C that purported
to justify a separation of efficiency and distribution."
E. Extensions and Qualifications
Despite the apparent generality of the arguments in sections A
through C and the more explicit framework developed in section D, it
is appropriate to consider both further extensions and possible quali-
fications. This section will confine attention to three of the most im-
19 Qualifications pertaining to nonmarginal changes and multiple optima in the presence
of nonconvexities are ignored, as the adjustments necessary in light of such complications are
straightforward.
20 The analysis in the present section is a good deal more abstract and general than that in
the preceding sections. For example, projects may have any pattern of effects across any number
of generations. The discussions in sections A through C proceeded as if projects have all of their
costs in one generation and all of their benefits in a single future generation. However, many pro-
jects-including environmental protection, infrastructure, and research and development-
undoubtedly involve benefits to many generations, including the present one. In the framework in
this section, this sort of complication can be seen to be irrelevant. The distribution-neutral tax ad-
justment in each generation reflects both the costs and benefits attributable to that generation from
any sort of reform whatsoever. With a bit more elaboration, one can also incorporate this consid-
eration into the previous analyses. Indeed, the analysis in section A did not require that benefits
or costs were confined to a single generation. For sections B and C, one can consider further
adjustments, such as to the level of debt carried between the generations, to provide appropriate
offsets. (For example, if a present project designed to benefit a future generation has a positive
benefit in the present, the cost can be reduced accordingly. One can also imagine that a Pigou-
vian subsidy accompanies the project, which, in section C's metaphor of a pool of funds, injects
additional revenue into the pool.)
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portant, involving labor supply and distortionary taxation, heterogene-
ity among individuals (aside from differences in generation and in-
come), and the applicability of the analysis to reforms that are not
distribution neutral. As will be seen, these considerations--along with
numerous others that might have been examined-are not distinctive
to the intergenerational context. 1 Indeed, for the most part, they are
presented by purely intragenerational policy decisions and are not
substantially altered, if at all, by adding an intergenerational dimen-
sion. Additional considerations are taken up in Parts III and IV.
1. Labor supply and distortionary taxation.
The analysis in section D took individuals' levels of (pre-tax) in-
come as given. A more complete formulation of the problem must
recognize that individuals' incomes are determined by their labor ef-
fort, which in turn is influenced by income taxation (and potentially
by projects). Specifically, taxing labor income distorts labor supply
downward, so that greater redistribution is accompanied by greater
distortion, the familiar equity-efficiency tradeoff. This distortion also
applies to intergenerational redistribution.2
The problem of labor supply distortion is of particular relevance
in the present context because of the possibility that second-best con-
siderations interfere with the separation of distribution and efficiency,
the latter now interpreted to concern the efficiency of intergenera-
tional investments (as distinct from efficiency in redistributive taxa-
tion per se). Especially since the 1970s, a great deal of attention has
been devoted to this question with regard to the financing of public
goods and the fiscal consequences of environmental policies, both of
which are important in the intergenerational context. Issues addressed
include the appropriateness of distributive weights (since although
one can redistribute more or less through the income tax, this method
is distortionary) and the concern that the financing of government
allocative policies may directly supplement pre-existing distortions or
23indirectly affect their magnitude.
21 For a catalog and some analysis of many of these factors, see Kaplow, The Theory of
Taxation and Public Economics at § 6.C (cited in note 12).
22 In addition, income taxes and other types of taxation may distort capital-that is, the
intertemporal allocation of resources. See Part IV.B.
23 On public goods, see, in addition to the sources on distributive weights cited in note 9,
work that builds on A.C. Pigou's classic, A Study in Public Finance 53 (Macmillan 1928). This
includes A.B. Atkinson and N.H. Stem, Pigou, Taxation and Public Goods, 41 Rev Econ Stud 119
(1974); Peter A. Diamond and James A. Mirrlees, Optimal Taxation and Public Production I1: Tax
Rules, 61 Am Econ Rev 261 (1971); J.E. Stiglitz and P Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public
Goods; and Economic Efficiency, 38 Rev Econ Stud 151 (1971); and the commentary in Charles
L. Ballard and Don Fullerton, Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods, 6 J Econ
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It turns out, however, that in a basic, benchmark case, labor sup-
ply is unaffected when a distribution-neutral income tax adjustment of
the sort described in section D is employed. It is useful to review the
argument, which extends as well to the intergenerational context."
First, recall that when the initial (hypothetical) distribution-neutral in-
come tax adjustment is employed in conjunction with the change from
regime z' to regime z*, each individual in each generation has the same
utility. More precisely, the income tax adjustment was constructed so
that, in each generation, those earning any level of income had the
same utility after the reform, including the income tax adjustment, as
they had before.
Consider the implication of this feature for any individual's
choice of labor supply. Different choices of labor supply are associated
with different levels of (before-tax) income. However, under the
present construct, each level of income maps to precisely the same
level of utility both before and after the reform (implicitly taking la-
bor supply to be constant). Hence, whatever level of income (deter-
mined by a particular level of labor supply) maximized utility initially
will continue to do so.n Therefore, no one's labor supply will be af-
fected. Accordingly, the conclusions that were valid previously -when
effects on labor supply were ignored-will continue to hold.
As stated at the outset, this analysis holds for a benchmark case.
One assumption of that case is that individuals within a given genera-
tion have the same utility function; that is, there is no preference het-
erogeneity. This assumption will be considered further in subsection 2.
Another assumption is that the mix of private consumption, public
goods, and externalities (including environmental amenities) that con-
tributes to a given level of utility does not influence the relative pref-
erence for labor versus leisure. To illustrate how this condition may
Persp 117 (Summer 1992). On environmental policies, see the survey in A. Lans Bovenberg and
Lawrence H. Goulder, Environmental Taxation and Regulation, in Alan J. Auerbach and Martin
Feldstein, eds, 3 Handbook of Public Economics 1471 (Elsevier 2002), and the collection of
articles in Lawrence H. Goulder, ed, Environmental Policy Making in Economies with Prior Tax
Distortions (Edward Elgar 2002).
24 This point is central in most of the references cited in note 12. A number of those
sources explicitly consider public goods and externalities, as well as different commodities that
individuals may choose to consume. Each of these may be interpreted as vectors, with elements
corresponding to the levels or effects of public goods, externalities, and commodities in different
time periods (generations). Likewise, as presented in section D, one can allow a separate income
tax schedule for each period. Making these interpretations and adjustments, the formal argu-
ments presented in prior work would hold true. The requirement in those proofs that individuals
have identical subutility functions of public goods, externalities, and commodities-in a setting in
which labor is weakly separable-would, with multiple generations, only require this commonal-
ity within each generation, which would, for example, allow the effects of an externality or of a
public good on utility to vary over time.
25 Again, for a more formal statement, see the sources cited in note 12.
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not hold, consider environmental improvements that make recrea-
tional venues more attractive. These enhancements may in turn in-
crease the relative desirability of leisure, inducing individuals to work
somewhat less. Given that labor supply is already distorted downward
due to redistributive income taxation, this result is socially costly, mak-
ing it optimal to undertake somewhat less of such environmental im-
provements. However, other environmental projects may make travel
to and time at or near one's workplace more inviting. The effect in this
case would be to induce additional labor effort, a social benefit in light
of the preexisting distortion, so it would be optimal to expand such
projects beyond the level that would otherwise be efficient .
Observe that, in either case, the adjustment does not depend on
the effects arising in a different generation from the project expendi-
tures. That is, the requisite adjustment is one that arises in the purely
intragenerational setting. Additionally, one might view this sort of con-
sideration as going more to efficiency, in that it affects the distortion
associated with the income tax, and, in addition, the nature of the ad-
justment (notably, its direction) does not depend upon the extent of
redistribution undertaken (although the magnitude of the adjustment
generally does).
2. Heterogeneity.
The analysis in section D assumed that individuals' utility func-
tions were of the form U(y - T,(y,z),z)' Through the subscript i on
the utility function, it was explicitly allowed that individuals in differ-
ent generations may have different utility functions; put another way,
a given regime z--including attributes such as levels of environmental
protection and investment in infrastructure-may affect individuals in
different generations differently, as one would expect. Furthermore,
within each generation, utility was taken to depend on income, y.
What this formulation implicitly rules out, however, is heterogeneous
preferences within generations and at given levels of income. For ex-
ample, all individuals in a specified future generation who have in-
come of $100,000 were taken to obtain the srme utility under regime z.
More realistically, individuals will vary, say, in how much they
value environmental protection. Nature lovers benefit more from con-
26 This idea is originally developed by W.J. Corlett and D.C. Hague, Complementarity and
the Excess Burden of Taxation, 21 Rev Econ Stud 21 (1953), in the context of differential com-
modity taxation.
27 If notation had been introduced for the extension in subsection 1, the utility function
would have had a third argument because utility was taken to depend on both after-tax income
and labor supply, in addition to the regime. This consideration is largely independent of the
present one and thus will be ignored here.
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serving natural habitats than do couch potatoes. Accordingly, the
claim that adopting more efficient policies is necessarily to everyone's
benefit requires qualification. The income tax adjustment, say, for a
program of enhanced habitat conservation, will, for future beneficiary
generations, reflect only average benefits (measured in dollars) at
each income level. Accordingly, efficient policies implemented in a
distribution-neutral fashion benefit each income group on average,
but do not necessarily help each and every individual. Future couch
potatoes who earn $100,000 thus may pay more on account of the tax
adjustment than the dollar value of the benefits they receive; likewise,
nature lovers will gain even more (they benefit from their pro rata
share of the efficiency gain and also because their benefits from con-
servation exceed average benefits for their income group). 2
This qualification should have little impact on the analysis. Note that
it is unrelated to intergenerational distributive justice. Indeed, it does not
even relate to intragenerational distributive justice, as ordinarily con-
strued, for the tax adjustment does achieve distribution neutrality be-
tween income groups both within and across generations. The unequal
treatment is within income groups that are within the same generation.
Inequality of this sort does tend to be suboptimal." Furthermore,
different regimes may increase or reduce inequality of this sort. For
example, if nature lovers are already better off (perhaps a side benefit
of their taste for nature is better health), then additional conservation
increases inequality in individuals' well-being. On the other hand, if
the environmental improvements are especially valuable to individu-
als with unusual sensitivity to pollution, then further protection re-
duces inequality. For these reasons, some projects should be carried
out to a greater or lesser extent than indicated by standard efficiency
tests that omit consideration of such heterogeneity. It should be em-
phasized, however, that this is not a distributive adjustment of a con-
28 Yew-Kwang Ng, Quasi-Pareto Social Improvements, 74 Am Econ Rev 1033 (1984), refers
to this situation as involving a quasi-Pareto improvement.
29 Even this residual heterogeneity could be removed if individuals differed in observable
ways that would allow more fine-tuned tax adjustments. For example, programs that dispropor-
tionally benefit or harm individuals living in certain regions could be accompanied by tax ad-
justments that vary geographically. Alternatively, user charges could be employed; these would
reduce heterogeneity but would introduce distortions in behavior (unless the efficient user
charge, equal to full marginal costs, including congestion costs, happened to equal benefits, which
would be true for the marginal user but not inframarginal ones).
30 Such inequity may reduce social welfare if favored individuals have lower marginal
utilities of income or if the social welfare function itself is strictly concave in individuals' utilities.
This sort of inequity is sometimes viewed distinctly, under the rubric of horizontal inequity, but it
is a mistake to analyze such inequity as a separate fount of social welfare rather than as indi-
rectly related to welfare, ordinarily construed. See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in
Search of a Principle, 42 Natl Tax J 139 (1989).
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ventional sort and, in particular, has nothing to do with the fact that a
policy has intergenerational effects.
3. Reforms not implemented in a distribution-neutral manner.
The preceding analysis, particularly the explicit framework em-
ployed in section D, assumes that reforms will be financed in a manner
that is overall distribution neutral, combining the effects of the policy
change and accompanying tax adjustment. This subsection considers
regime changes that are not distribution neutral. (Although this Arti-
cle is addressed to intergenerational issues, the analysis is largely the
same, at least conceptually, if the lack of distribution neutrality is
within one or more generations or across generations, so for the most
part these dimensions will not be distinguished here.)
First, the distribution-neutral framework helps to illuminate non-
distribution-neutral reforms. To see this, observe that any such reform
can be decomposed into two components: (1) a distribution-neutral
reform, consisting of the underlying policy change and the (hypotheti-
cal) distribution-neutral tax adjustment specified in section D, and
(2) a purely redistributive reform, one that substitutes the actual
method of finance for the distribution-neutral one." This decomposition
is helpful because it is clear how each of the components should be ana-
lyzed. Component (1) presents an efficiency question, as outlined pre-
viously. Component (2) presents a pure question of distributive justice.
It is worth elaborating on the second component. One virtue of
isolating the distributive element is that the analysis of it is generic.
That is, if an aggregate policy transfers a given amount of resources
from some future generation to the present, the same distributive
analysis is applicable regardless of whether the source of the intergen-
erational redistribution is from environmental degradation, failing to
maintain infrastructure, or running up a larger national debt. To be
sure, the efficiency analysis of such policies may differ, but taking that
as given, the distributive analysis is the same. Recognition of this point
should clarify many policy debates and facilitate useful academic spe-
cialization (environmental specialists can focus on the environment,
civil engineers on infrastructure, and others on distribution).
Next, consider how the second component should affect the
overall analysis of a reform -assuming, that is, that the change in re-
distribution is indeed specially linked to the particular policy change.
Suppose, for example, that the reform increases redistribution (say, it
31 This approach is advanced in Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics
(cited in note 12); Kaplow, 18 J Econ Persp 159 (cited in note 12), and Kaplow, 49 Natl Tax J 513
(cited in note 12).
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moves resources from a richer to a poorer generation). This increase
would be desirable if the extent of redistribution was too little, unde-
sirable if already too much, and indifferent if just right. Redistribution,
after all, is something that should be done optimally, not maximally,
because of the tradeoff with distortion. At the redistributive optimum,
the benefits of further redistribution just equal the costs of additional
distortion. Hence, when at the optimum, small changes are a matter of
indifference, and when near the optimum, they matter only slightly.
Even when away from the optimum, there is still a partial offset. For
example, if redistribution were inadequate, increasing it would be de-
sirable, but the redistributive benefit would nevertheless be accompa-
nied by some increase in distortion.
Finally, although this Article is not primarily concerned with po-
litical considerations, it is worth some reflection on the plausibility of
distribution neutrality. A conjecture is that, if one had to predict a pri-
ori the most likely long-run distributive impact of a policy change,
distribution neutrality would be the best guess. The explanation (aside
from insufficient reason to make any particular contrary assumption)
is that the extent of redistribution that arises in a society typically re-
flects some balance of political forces. If that balance remains the
same, so too would the approximate extent of redistribution. Further-
more, if that balance should change, one would expect the extent of
redistribution to adjust accordingly, without regard to whether one or
another particular substantive policy is implemented.32 To repeat, the
foregoing is merely a conjecture of what may tend to be true roughly,
on average, and in the long run, not a precise description of any par-
ticular political reality.3
It should also be noted that the conceptual separation repre-
sented by the two-part decomposition has a counterpart in terms of real
policymaking. Income taxes can be modified in myriad ways, and fre-
quently are. Moreover, when one considers the panoply of policies that
may be adjusted to influence the intergenerational distribution of in-
come, it seems clear that a policymaking body could, if it wished, adopt
either of the two components independently. That is, if it liked some
32 For example, if the weight on future generations reflects the extent of altruism toward
descendants, one can imagine that, ordinarily, this weighting does not change very much in the
near term and, furthermore, that if the weighting does shift, the change may be acted upon in any
number of ways (as mundane as reducing or raising national debt, at the cost or to the benefit of
currently living generations).
33 Competing conjectures are most likely to reflect particular pending proposals. However,
the momentary packaging of a proposal with significant intergenerational effects may be a poor
guide to its actual, long-run distributive consequences. Pre-enactment packaging often changes,
implemented reforms are subsequently amended, and other components of the system may ulti-
mately adjust in reaction to a redistributive shift that is contrary to the balance of political forces.
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substantive policy but had no intention of changing distribution, it
could implement that policy in a distribution-neutral fashion. And if it
wished to change the extent of redistribution but found to be ineffi-
cient a substantive policy that, in isolation (without an offsetting tax
adjustment), had the desired distributive effect, it could reject the pol-
icy and achieve the desired shift in redistribution directlym An addi-
tional, optimistic note is that if more attention were devoted to formu-
lating distribution-neutral policy packages, policymaking might be
improved. After all, efficient distribution-neutral policies benefit every-
one (or at least each income group in each generation) and thus may be
likely to garner support, and inefficient distribution-neutral policies
are to everyone's detriment and thus should be difficult to implement.
Of course, politics does not always work this way, in part because
some costs and benefits are harder to perceive -and for other reasons.
One additional aspect of the political dimension is that some poli-
cies with intergenerational consequences impose costs and benefits
that cross national boundaries. (This is true of purely intragenera-
tional policies as well.) At this point in time, there does not exist an
apparatus to provide for smooth distributively offsetting adjustments.
There is no international tax and transfer authority and no multina-
tional mechanism that can readily carry out international transfers of
various sorts. Some side payments are made, and progress in reaching
international agreement often proceeds bilaterally or regionally. In
any event, international distributive effects may significantly influence
the second, distributive component of the decomposition.
34 It is sometimes suggested that a society wishing to benefit distant future generations, say,
through reducing emissions that contribute to global warming, may not find it feasible to benefit
those generations through alternatives such as ordinary capital investments because interim genera-
tions may consume the proceeds See, for example, Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 132 (cited
in note 2); Robert C. Lind, Analysis for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, in Portney and Weyant,
eds, Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 173 (cited in note 2). The concern is that subsequent
generations will be less generous toward the future, even as that future becomes closer in time.
Specific reasons for this supposition are not offered, but, assuming it to be true, it is hardly clear that
choosing one rather than another present policy to benefit the distant future avoids this problem.
Just as proceeds from capital investments can be consumed rather than reinvested, so public debt
can be run up, conserved resources can be utilized, and even many environmental protections can
readily be reversed or allowed to lapse. (In the case of the latter, for example, if the interim genera-
tion does not care so much about the future, it can expend less to further restrict emissions or to
control new sources). Note also that it is not necessary for a relatively selfish interim generation to
benefit itself at the expense of the future through reversing the precise policy by which a previous
generation meant to benefit the distant future. The interim generation may be expected to choose
whichever mix of policies would provide it the greatest benefit at a given cost to the future. If re-
strictions in the present generation are not in fact the most efficient way to generate future benefits,
there will be less overall for the interim generation to divide between itself and the future. Accord-
ingly, for a given weighting of the two generations, the result of the interim generation's actions will
most plausibly make the distant future generations even worse off than if the present generation
simply adopted the most efficient policies going forward.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF INTERGENERATIONAL DISTRIBUTIVE
JUSTICE FOR INTERGENERATIONAL EFFICIENCY
The central claim of this Article is that, in principle, intergenera-
tional efficiency should be pursued independently of how questions of
intergenerational distributive justice are answered. This Part explores
some interdependencies between efficiency and distribution, none of
which, it turns out, disturbs the original claim.
A. Efficient Policies May Depend on Distribution
It is familiar that, in a setting with only a single generation, which
policies are efficient depends on the distribution of income. Even in
the first-best world of the two fundamental theorems of welfare eco-
nomics, the second theorem holds that for any distribution (specifi-
cally, for any Pareto optimal allocation), there exists a set of prices
that can sustain the allocation as a competitive equilibrium. In gen-
eral, different allocations give rise to different relative prices. Prices
depend on distribution because the relative demand for different
goods depends on income, and because preferences may vary among
individuals, as noted in Part II.E.2.
Efficient government policies likewise depend on prices. The cost
of providing a public good or cleaning the environment depends on
input prices. Moreover, individuals' valuations of public projects de-
pend on their incomes.35 To take one example, valuations of at least
some environmental amenities are generally believed to rise dispro-
portionately with income; if so, a more unequal distribution of income
would be associated with a greater marginal social valuation for envi-
ronmental improvements.3
This basic principle is equally applicable in the intergenerational
context.37 In addition to the dependence of project costs and benefits
on relative prices (including prices in between generations), prefer-
ence heterogeneity obviously matters since the costs and benefits of
projects with intergenerational effects are borne by different genera-
tions. If a project's benefits rise at all with income (even less than pro-
portionately), a distribution of income more favorable to a future
generation will tend to make projects that benefit the future more
35 See, for example, note 16.
36 Suppose that individuals' marginal valuations are proportional to the square of income.
If each of two individuals has income of y, the sum of their marginal valuations is (proportional
to) 2y'. If instead their incomes are y - a and y + a, the sum of their marginal valuations is (pro-
portional to) 2y'+ 2a', which is increasing in a and thus in the extent of inequality.
37 One price of particular relevance in the intergenerational setting (but also relevant
intragenerationally) is the interest rate, which itself may depend on the intergenerational distri-
bution of income. See Part IV.C.
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valuable. One way of viewing the matter is to note that the pool of
resources available for a future generation (see Part II.C) is larger, so
in general more will tend to be allocated for most uses, just as a single
individual who receives a larger income will typically buy more of
many goods. Furthermore, because relative valuations tend to change
with income, the efficient relative allocation of resources across pro-
jects will depend on the intergenerational distribution. Taking a con-
crete example, if a future generation is richer, it will place a higher
value on clean air and water, and the most efficient way of producing
environmental improvements for that generation will involve some
further expenditure toward that end in the prior generation.
For the most part, the analysis in Part II took the intergenera-
tional distribution as given and asked what intergenerational policies
were efficient. The valuations of costs and benefits to present and fu-
ture generations were in all cases based on the rates of conversion
between utility and dollars within each generation. This was explicit in
Part II.A; Part II.B employed the same procedure as did II.A; as just
noted, the use of the pool metaphor in Part II.C entailed the use of
the future generation's level of income in evaluating its benefits; and
the tax adjustments for each generation in Part II.D were set equal to
individuals' dollar valuations of costs and benefits and therefore de-
pended on the income levels of individuals in the pertinent genera-
tion. The present discussion merely highlights the point that those
valuations depend on the overall level of income in each generation
(as well as the distribution of income within the generation) and thus
may be different if the distribution is different. But as long as those
income-dependent valuations are used, the relevant impact of distri-
bution on efficiency is taken into account."
Put another way, arguments that we should, for example, expend
more to protect the environment for the future because we should
care more about future generations are in one important sense cor-
rect, despite the proposed separation of intergenerational distributive
justice and efficiency. If the future matters more, resources in general
should be allocated more in favor of those who will live in the future.
The optimal allocation of those additional resources will, as noted,
plausibly include a greater allocation to environmental protection.
This result reflects an ordinary income effect. The same logic suggests
that more resources should be allocated to other intergenerational
38 A further subtlety is that changing one project may affect the efficiency of another
project, both because of utility interdependencies and because funding more or less of one pro-
ject may change the marginal utility of income and thus the valuation of another project. These
points affect the outcomes of proper efficiency analysis but not the merits of basing policy
choices on efficiency.
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investments, such as infrastructure and research and development,
whether for medical research or improving the entertainment value of
toys, for most such things will be valued more in the future if future
generations are to receive a greater allocation of resources. It may
well be that, as incomes rise, relatively more would be allocated to the
environment than to other goods, but to the extent that this is true it
will automatically be reflected in an efficiency analysis that employs
dollar valuations from the generations that bear the costs and benefits
of various possible projects.
B. Private Intergenerational Transfers, Liquidity Constraints,
and Intergenerational Redistribution
Although this Article is only indirectly about intergenerational
redistribution, it is useful to explore certain of its properties that may
have efficiency implications (aside from the standard point that redis-
tribution per se tends to be distortionary) .3' A central consideration is
the feasibility of intergenerational redistribution in light of offsetting
private behavior.
The notion of Ricardian equivalence, advanced by Robert Barro,
holds in its purest form that changes in government intergenerational
transfers will be matched by equal and opposite changes in private
intergenerational transfers.* Suppose that members of the present
generation (parents) are altruistically linked to corresponding mem-
bers of the subsequent generation (children). In simple models of al-
truism, the parents' aggregate utility is taken to be a function of two
components: utility from their own consumption and their children's
utility. Such altruistic parents will allocate resources between them-
selves and their children to equate the marginal contributions to their
aggregate utility from each component. Suppose this involves a net
transfer of $X to their children. Now if for some reason the parents
discovered that they had one dollar less and that their children had
one dollar more to begin with, the parents would instead choose a
39 Note that if only intergenerational distributive justice (if it could be defined independ-
ently of intragenerational distributive justice) were a concern, redistribution could be imple-
mented in a nondistortionary fashion. If the only relevant feature determining the quantity and
direction of taxes and transfers was the generation to which one belonged, then payments would
be solely a function of an observable and immutable characteristic, in which case no behavior
would be distorted. However, when inter- and intragenerational distributive justice are com-
bined, it is likely that a change in the extent of intergenerational redistribution would optimally
involve some changes in marginal tax (inclusive of transfer) rates within generations, which
would influence the extent of distortion.
40 See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J Polit Econ 1095 (1974),
building on the model of altruism in Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J Polit
Econ 1063 (1974).
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transfer of $(X - 1), producing the same net result as they had (opti-
mally) obtained previously.
Government intergenerational transfers have this feature. Imag-
ine that the government in some fashion transfers an additional per
capita dollar from the current generation to the next. For example, it
might raise current taxes to retire some of the government's debt, so
less needs to be repaid by the next generation. In response, this theory
implies that parents would transfer one dollar less, leaving each gen-
eration at the same level of income it was at previously. Accordingly,
the government's attempt at intergenerational redistribution would
have failed. Similar logic applies if the government were to raise taxes
to fund infrastructure or environmental protection designed to benefit
the next generation. In this case, however, the offset would involve the
future generation receiving fewer dollars but more infrastructure or a
cleaner environment than it received previously, which raises a ques-
tion of efficiency.41
If intergenerational redistribution were impossible, intergenera-
tional distributive justice would be moot, but it would remain true that
intergenerational efficiency should be pursued. Indeed, the constructs
employed in Part II to hold the intergenerational distribution of in-
come constant would be unnecessary if this result would be produced
automatically by adjustments to private transfers.
It is generally thought, however, that although there may be some
offsets, Ricardian equivalence does not hold. Not everyone has chil-
dren, destroying complete linkage. Not all parents are altruistic (in the
formal sense); that is, they may be motivated to make transfers to chil-
dren, but not according to the utility function described above. And not
all altruistic parents will operate in the relevant range; for example, if
their children are sufficiently well off relative to themselves, they may
make no transfers despite their altruism, so they cannot reduce transfers
to offset the government's increase in intergenerational redistribution.
A further point of interest is that changes in intergenerational re-
distribution can have efficiency implications when private transfers
respond. For example, suppose that some parents provide their mar-
ginal transfers in the form of human capital, by devoting time and re-
sources to their children's education. For them to reduce transfers
may require reducing this sort of investment even if its return exceeds
the market interest rate. This result could be avoided if children could
essentially borrow the funds from their parents to finance efficient
41 There is also a subtle feedback on the extent of net transfers, for the incremental benefit
through greater infrastructure or environmental protection may not reduce the future genera-
tion's marginal utility of income to the same extent as did the dollars the parents would other-
wise have transferred.
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investments in their own human capital, but such contracts are not
generally feasible.
The primary relevance of the foregoing discussion concerns the
character of proper efficiency analysis of intergenerational policies,
not whether efficiency analysis should be conducted. Notably, the re-
turn to human capital investments may exceed the ordinary market
return in equilibrium due to liquidity constraints. Accordingly, allocat-
ing more of the pool of resources available for a future generation to
education and the like rather than to ordinary capital investments and
other projects may be efficient. Likewise, this reallocation may be fa-
cilitated by providing loans to younger generations to avoid the det-
rimental impact of liquidity constraints on investment in human capi-
tal (which allows the members of the next generation themselves to
choose to allocate more resources in this fashion). Of course, most
governments pursue such policies, although there are many other mo-
tivations that may help to explain this activity. 2 In addition, to the ex-
tent that such policies do not fully remedy the problem, the optimal
intergenerational distribution may be affected, for the marginal wel-
fare gain from redistributing dollars to generations containing liquid-
ity-constrained children may accordingly be greater.
Finally, it is worth observing that the present issue can be viewed
in purely intragenerational terms. To the extent that some individuals
are liquidity constrained, the marginal social value of a dollar to
them-at the times of their life during which they are liquidity con-
strained -is greater. This is true whether liquidity constraints prevent
investments in human capital, in entrepreneurship, or simply in con-
sumption smoothing (borrowing from future, higher-earning years to
raise consumption in earlier, lower-earning years). Accordingly,
greater intragenerational redistribution than otherwise may turn out
to be optimal (assuming that lower-income individuals are more likely
to be liquidity constrained); changing the timing of tax obligations over
the lifecycle may be advantageous; and simple projects such as spending
more on a park may be less attractive because some who would have•43
to pay more in taxes have a higher marginal utility of income.
42 For example, education may be thought to have social spillovers, so that the social return
exceeds the private return. Additionally, some (or most) parents may be thought to allocate too
little to their children's futures due to misinformation, myopia, or self interest, making in-kind
provision by the government optimal.
43 See Glenn R. Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd, Liquidity Constraints Fiscal Policy, and
Consumption, 1 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 1 (1986) (with comments by Robert E. Hall
and Lawrence Summers); Glenn R. Hubbard and Kenneth L. Judd, Social Security and Individ-
ual Welfare: Precautionary Saving, Borrowing Constraints and the Payroll Tax, 77 Am Econ Rev
630 (1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Imperfect Capital Markets, Intertemporal Redistribution, and
Progressive Taxation, in Harold M. Hochman and George E. Peterson, eds, Redistribution
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C. Relevance of Greater (or Lesser) Wealth of Future Generations
It is often hypothesized that future generations will be wealthier
on account of continuing technological advances, in which case inter-
generational redistribution should be favorable to present generations.4
This justifies less saving (running up greater debt) and less effort to fur-
ther research and development, enhance infrastructure, protect the en-
vironment, and maintain resource stocks. The socially optimal mix
among these policies is dictated on pure efficiency grounds, as devel-
oped in Part II. Indeed, the same criterion is appropriate under the
opposite assumption, that future generations will be worse off, which
may arise due to overpopulation, pollution, and the greater lethality of
future risks of war and terrorism."
These familiar ideas, however, may not capture the entire phe-
nomenon. Consider, for example, the prospect that enhanced knowl-
edge will improve the well-being of future generations. Furthermore,
suppose in particular that the gain will accrue due to more effective
use of given resources. One way to think of this is that a dollar will
buy more effective consumption. (Consider how the value per dollar
of expenditures on personal computers has grown in the past few dec-
ades.) In that case, there are two competing effects. First, more should
be allocated to generations with better technology because each dollar
goes further. Second (the more familiar point), less should be allo-
cated because, since those generations have higher effective wealth for
a given allocation, their marginal utility is less. Which factor is greater
is an empirical question; plausibly, the second is greater, although it
must be kept in mind that a partial, possibly substantial offset is pro-
vided by the first."
Through Public Choice 229 (Columbia 1974); Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public Eco-
nomics (cited in note 12).
44 See also Part V. The extent depends on the concavity of the social welfare function. For
example, under a utilitarian formulation, richer individuals have a lower marginal utility of in-
come and, to that extent, should be taxed more in order to finance transfers to poorer individu-
als. Further preferences for equality, favored for example by Rawls, A Theory of Justice (cited in
note 2) and Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality (Oxford enlarged ed 1997), would go further
than this (assuming that incentive considerations cause utilitarian redistribution to stop short of
egalitarianism).
45 An important distinction arises, however, if adverse outcomes reduce population size or
the likelihood that life will continue to exist. In that case, many accept that there should be a
probability discount on the future-not reflecting any difference in the value of life or utility but
instead reflecting the reduced likelihood that the value will be realized. See, for example, Parfit,
Reasons and Persons at 482 (cited in note 2).
46 A variant of this problem is modeled in Kaplow, The Theory of Taxation and Public
Economics at § 12.A.2 (cited in note 12), and Louis Kaplow, Optimal Distribution and the Family,
98 Scandinavian J Econ 75 (1996), for the case of economies of scale in family consumption.
Suppose, for example, that individuals in the better-off generation have utility of income given by
u(ay) rather than by u(y), where a > 1. Then, the marginal utility of income is given by a u'(ay)
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It has also been suggested that future generations' greater wealth
implies that they will have higher marginal valuations, for example,
higher values of statistical lives (VSL), which will offset what would
seem to be the lower valuations on future lives that result from dis-
counting dollars." For example, if the VSL is $5 million in the present
and in the future, then the discounting of dollars would imply that a
future life is only worth 1/(1 + R) as much as a present life. If future
generations are richer, so that their VSL is higher, say, by a factor of
(1 + R), then discounting dollars implies equivalent weights on lives.
(Note that this logic also implies that, if future generations were
poorer, their lives would count less for two reasons- their lower VSLs
and the discounting of dollars- although it should be kept in mind
that the discount rate may differ in this scenario.)
Whether and the extent to which future generations have higher
VSLs depends on their relative wealth, which in turn is a function of
the intergenerational distribution that is chosen.4 To take a simple and
highly stylized example, suppose that there is a fixed pot of resources
in the present that is to be divided between two individuals, one living
presently and one in the future, and that the intergenerational interest
rate is R. Consider an equal division of the pot. The half that is saved
for the future individual will, when the future arrives, be worth 1 + R
times as much (in that period's dollars) as the half was worth to the
present individual (in that period's dollars). Now, assume further that,
when resources are larger by a given factor, then VSL is larger by pre-
cisely the same factor. In that case, an equal division would indeed
produce VSLs that were equal in discounted present value. Moreover,
it can be shown that, under these assumptions about the relationship
between individuals' utility functions (which determine VSLs), the pos-
tulated equal division of the initial pot is the optimal distribution from a
utilitarian and other standard welfarist perspectives.49
rather than by u'(y). In the case in which utility is given by the natural log of income, marginal
utility is the inverse of (effective) income, so the first expression equals a(llay) and the second is
1/y; obviously, these values are equal, which is to say that the two effects are precisely offsetting.
If utility were more concave (which is equivalent to stating that the coefficient of relative risk
aversion exceeds one, as is commonly supposed), then the first marginal utility would be less
than the second. A more concave social welfare function would have similar implications.
47 See, for example, Peter Singer, One World- The Ethics of Globalization 25-26 (Yale 2d ed 2004).
48 Furthermore, as explored in Part IV.C, the intergenerational distribution also may
influence R.
49 Just as in note 46, the pertinent relationship is that utility is a function of the natural log
of resources. To translate the analysis there to the present setting, let a = 1 + R. Then if the same
present-period income is allocated to each individual, call this amount y, the previous expres-
sions apply, in which case effective marginal utility is equalized. Also by analogy to the preceding
case, greater concavity in the utility function would imply that effective marginal utility is equal-
ized by a division somewhat more favorable to the present generation.
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This latter discussion indicates that, not surprisingly, valuations of
projects (whether involving different risks to life or otherwise) will
depend, as section A states, on the distribution of income. As before,
however, whatever that intergenerational distribution is or should be, if
it is taken as given, projects should be chosen on grounds of efficiency.
IV. MARKET INTEREST RATE
Following the prescription of Part II that future project costs and
benefits, measured in dollars, be discounted to the present, it is neces-
sary for the assessment of intergenerational efficiency to determine
the proper market interest rate. This choice is not straightforward, in
part because there is not a single such rate that is appropriate in all
circumstances.% Or, to put the point differently, one can choose a sin-
gle benchmark rate, but for some projects it may be necessary to make
certain adjustments. There are also additional complications, some of
which are also considered in this Part." As with much of the analysis in
this Article, however, most of the refinements are not unique to the
intergenerational context. That is, even if the discounting were only
over a single year or if a long-term investment had purely intragenera-
tional effects (consider young workers setting aside funds for retire-
ment or possible nursing home care), an interest rate would have to be
chosen and most of the factors considered here would have the same
implications as in the intergenerational context. Indeed, as noted pre-
viously, dollars invested, say, in a machine that will produce goods in
the future (which in turn will be sold for dollars) neither know nor
care (if they were capable) whether the proceeds are to be distributed
to individuals of an earlier generation (perhaps at retirement) or a
later one.
A. Uncertainty
The market interest rate-the private return to capital-is taken
to be the relevant interest rate for purposes of discounting dollar costs
50 Actually, if there were a single interest rate relevant for all purposes, the implication of
choosing the wrong rate would be entirely distributive. For example, choosing too high a rate
would undervalue everything occurring in the future to the same extent. That is, placing too high
of a discount rate on dollars is equivalent to excessively discounting utility (relative to whatever
is the appropriate normative rate).
51 The list here does not attempt to be exhaustive. Among others, macroeconomic and
general equilibrium effects of public projects are not considered; nor are (positive or negative)
externalities to consumption growth. Most pertinent issues have been addressed in a substantial
literature. See, for example, Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity (cited in note 2); Coleman Bazelon
and Kent Smetters, Discounting Inside the Washington D.C. Beltway, 13 J Econ Persp 213 (Fall
1999); Lind, et al, Discounting for Time (cited in note 4); William D. Nordhaus, Managing the
Global Commons: The Economics of Climate Change ch 6 (MIT 1994).
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and benefits from public projects because market investments are vi-
able alternatives. As the analysis in Part II.B explains, if a public project
is attractive when discounting at the market rate, it can be increased
and market investment reduced in an amount sufficient to finance the
project, producing a net gain. Likewise, if the public project is unattrac-
tive at this rate, reducing its scope will free resources that can be in-
vested in the private capital market for a better return.
The market interest rate, as is well known, contains a premium
for systematic (market-wide) risk.52 It can be thought of as a riskless
rate (representing the pure time value of money) and an additional
component to compensate for riskiness. This feature raises two issues.
First, not all projects have the same risk profile. In the capital
market, investments that are negatively correlated to the market as a
whole are more attractive in terms of their impact on the owner's risk
and thus pay a lower return, whereas those that vary with and to a
greater extent than the market must pay a higher return. Likewise, in
determining the appropriate discount rate for public projects, it is ap-
propriate to employ an interest rate that reflects the relationship be-
tween the project's risks and those of the economy as a whole. 3
Second, it is sometimes suggested that there should be no risk ad-
justment for public projects-they should be discounted at the risk-
free rate of return-because the government is able to pool risks
widely.' It is well understood, however, that this view is based on as-
sumptions that do not generally match reality. The government can, at
best, achieve diversification across the economy as a whole. Accord-
ingly, it should ignore idiosyncratic project risks, which are thereby
eliminated. Of course, with diversified ownership (directly, or through
insurance or other arrangements), idiosyncratic risks in the private
market do not ordinarily command a risk premium either. Regarding
economy-wide risks, however, the government should in principle em-
ploy a discount rate reflecting systematic risk to the extent that the
project in question involves such risk, as discussed in the preceding
paragraph. A possible exception concerns risks that span generations,
where the government may have some advantage relative to incom-
52 Nominal interest rates also include a component to offset the effects of inflation. The
discussion in the text should be interpreted as focusing on real interest rates.
53 See, for example, Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity (cited in note 2); Martin J. Bailey
and Michael C. Jensen, Risk and the Discount Rate for Public Investment, in Michael C. Jensen,
ed, Studies in the Theory of Capital Markets 269 (Praeger 1972); Lind, A Primer on the Major
Issues (cited in note 4); Agnar Sandmo, Discount Rates for Public Investment Under Uncertainty,
13 Intl Econ Rev 287 (1972); Robert Wilson, Risk Measurement of Public Projects, in Lind, et al,
Discounting for Time 205 (cited in note 4).
54 See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow and Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation
of Public Investment Decisions, 60 Am Econ Rev 364 (1970).
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plete private markets, which may influence the appropriate discount
rate for projects spanning into the distant future.5
In light of the foregoing points, the government could proceed in
a number of ways.56 It could employ as its standard discount rate the
market rate, which includes systematic risk, with adjustments to the
extent that the government's project should carry a higher or lower
risk premium. Or it could use as a benchmark the riskless rate, with
adjustments (more often upward, and to a greater degree) from that
starting point. If it were the case that the average government project
had a profile similar to that of the average private project, it is proba-
bly more sensible to use the market rate, inclusive of the standard risk
premium, as the default. Another approach would be to employ dif-
ferent starting points for different agencies or different types of pro-
jects. In particular, certain projects-like strategic reserves, protection
against large-scale natural disasters, and provisions for national de-
fense-might ordinarily tend to offset economy-wide risk; for them, a
benchmark below the riskless rate might be sensible.
An additional type of uncertainty concerns interest rates them-
selves. Especially when discounting over long periods of time (beyond
which even long-term financial instruments do not provide much of a
prediction of future interest rates), interest rate uncertainty can have a
substantial impact on how discounting should be done. The main rea-
son is that it is inappropriate simply to employ the mean predicted
interest rate. When compounding over long periods, discounting at rates
that may be high or may be low, taking the probability-weighted aver-
age of the outcome, does not produce results equivalent to discounting
at the average rate. Instead, uncertainty implies a substantially lower
rate of discount in the long run.
55 See, for example, Robert J. Shiller, Social Security and Institutions for Intergenerational,
Intragenerational, and International Risk-Sharing, 50 Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series Pub
Pol 165 (1999).
56 An additional complication is that, with more than two periods, a single discount rate
does not ordinarily provide an appropriate risk adjustment unless the relationship between risk
and return follows a particular time pattern (specifically, the ratio of the certainty equivalent to
the expected value must be falling at a certain rate). See, for example, Lind, A Primer on the
Major Issues at 63-67 (cited in note 4); Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Rate of Discount for Benefit-Cost
Analysis and the Theory of the Second Best, in Lind, et al, Discounting for Time 151,197 (cited in
note 4). It is appropriate more generally to convert each period's returns into a certainty equiva-
lent and then discount these (at the riskless rate). For any particular project, one can always use
this method to determine a single discount rate that produces the same result, but the proper
rate is project specific and can only be determined as a byproduct of determining the proper
result in the first instance.
57 See Richard Newell and William Pizer, Discounting the Distant Future: How Much Do
Uncertain Rates Increase Valuations?, 46 J Envir Econ & Mgmt 52 (2003); Martin L. Weitzman,
Why the Far-Distant Future Should Be Discounted at Its Lowest Possible Rate, 36 J Envir Econ &
Mgmt 201 (1998). Taking a simple example, if $1.00 ten years in the future is discounted to the
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Another factor is that uncertainty regarding the well-being of fu-
ture generations may bear on the optimal distribution between gen-
erations. Taking the simple case in which income of a subsequent gen-
eration is uncertain, it follows that transfer of a certain dollar will have
a higher expected marginal payoff than otherwise. The principle is the
same as that involved in determining optimal precautionary savings
for a single individual facing earnings uncertainty." Analogous reason-
ing may apply to uncertainty regarding public projects where effects
are nonlinear (such as is the case with the marginal utility of income). 9
B. Taxation of the Market Return to Capital
It is common for income and other taxes to impose some burden
on the market return to capital. ° This causes a distortion because the
full, pre-tax return to capital (which reflects the marginal product of
capital) is not realized by investors, who receive only the lower, after-tax
return. This presents the question of whether the full, pre-tax return, the
lower, after-tax return realized by investors, or some weighted average
of the two should be employed in evaluating government projects."
There is no simple answer. On one hand, the full, pre-tax return is
the social return, which seems to make it appropriate to discount at that
rate. Moreover, the government's use of the same rate as the private
present at a 5% rate, the value is approximately $0.61. If it is discounted at 10% the value is
approximately $0.39 and at 0% the value is $1.00, the latter two averaging to approximately
$0.69, which is greater than $0.61, the result of discounting at the average rate of 5%. (Discount-
ing at about 3.8% would produce the result of approximately $0.69.) The intuition is that higher
rates have an ever-decreasing relative impact on the result as the time period increases, so low
rates have a greater effect. Note that the phenomenon illustrated here would be much greater if
the time period were substantially longer.
58 For standard utility functions, reducing income by a given amount raises marginal utility
by more than increasing income by the same amount reduces marginal utility; hence, increased
uncertainty increases the average, or expected, marginal utility of income.
59 For example, if the amount of future environmental degradation is uncertain and the
harm of degradation rises nonlinearly, then more present protection is optimal than if the ex-
pected (average) degradation were the same but certain.
60 For a pure accrual income tax imposed at the rate t, an annual before-tax interest rate r
yields the after-tax return (1 - t)r, which can reduce the long-term return substantially when this
reduced rate is compounded. In addition, many countries also tax capital held in the corporate
form. However, because most income taxes are not pure accrual taxes, sometimes providing
reduced rates for dividends and capital gains, taxing on a realization basis (with possible forgive-
ness at death), and exempting some types of investments and certain investors (creating oppor-
tunities for arbitrage, especially given the tax deductibility of interest), the effective tax rate on
capital tends to be much lower. See, for example, Roger Gordon, et al, Toward a Consumption
Tax, and Beyond, 94 Am Econ Assoc Papers and Proceedings 161 (2004). (Since relief is pro-
vided unevenly, however, much interasset distortion may nevertheless result.)
61 See, for example, Kenneth J. Arrow, The Rate of Discount of Public Investments with
Imperfect Capital Markets, in Lind, et al, Discounting for Time 115 (cited in note 4); Arrow, et al,
Intertemporal Equity at 135-36,138 (cited in note 2); Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues (cited in
note 4); and Stiglitz, The Rate of Discount (cited in note 56).
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sector avoids biasing government-private decisions.6' On the other
hand, if the government does undertake a project that looks favorable
when benefits are discounted at the lower, after-tax rate but not at the
higher, before-tax rate, individuals would tend to view such decisions
positively, since they discount benefits at the after-tax rate. 6
A commonly proposed solution is to discount at a weighted aver-
age rate. A higher weight is to be applied to full, pre-tax return to the
extent that the social investment project is expected to displace private
investment (since then it is the full return on private investment that is
forgone by society). Correspondingly, to the extent that consumption is
what is displaced, greater weight would be accorded to the investors'
after-tax return, the rate at which individuals discount consumption.
Although the literature does not usually pursue the matter in
depth, it seems that the most plausible conjecture is that investment
(savings) would be displaced.M Suppose that the government financed
the project by raising present taxes and that individuals reduced
present consumption to cover this obligation.? The proceeds are as-
sumed to finance a public project that provides future benefits, which
may be viewed as augmenting future consumption.? If individuals had
previously allocated their consumption across periods (chosen savings
rates) in a privately optimal fashion (given the interest rate they face),
they would now find that they would have too much future consump-
62 Indeed, an argument for using the full, pre-tax return is that government projects with a
return below that rate are dominated by the government using the same funds to invest in mar-
ginal private projects, which by definition pay the full, pre-tax return. (Such investment could be
undertaken directly, or through taking an equity stake, which might be held passively.) It has
further been recognized that, taken to its limit, the government's ability to compete for private
projects without having to pay taxes on its returns could lead to full government ownership of
the economy, a result generally taken to be inefficient. See, for example, Lind, A Primer on the
Major Issues at 32 (cited in note 4).
63 This description applies to investments with current costs and future benefits. The logic
is analogous for the opposite pattern, such as when greater use of natural resources or degrada-
tion of the environment produces immediate benefits but long-term costs.
64 Lind, A Primer on the Major Issues at 45 (cited in note 4), briefly notes that, in a model
in which individuals are simply stipulated to save a given percentage of their resources, a public
project providing future benefits might be perceived as part of such savings, although he does
not adopt this view in the remainder of his discussion.
65 Alternatively, suppose that the project is financed by public debt, which is to be paid off
(inclusive of interest) at the time the benefits are conferred. In that case, some of individuals'
savings would have to be allocated to holding the debt, displacing private investment. By reason-
ing analogous to that in the text, individuals would find the resulting allocation of consumption
over time optimal, so they would not be motivated to increase their savings.
66 Whether public projects are a substitute for consumption is an empirical question that
depends on how the projects enter individuals' utility functions. Public projects that do not have
the effect of substituting for consumption may well have a different effect on the marginal utility
of consumption and thus on savings than that hypothesized in the text. This phenomenon, how-
ever, could also arise with a project producing present benefits.
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tion and too little in the present. To restore the prior balance, they
would need to reduce present savings by the amount of the present tax.67
The first-best solution involves no market distortion of investors'
decisions. If implemented, there would be no need for the government
to choose between before- and after-tax interest rates. If not, there
seems to be a good case for choosing the before-tax rate. In any event,
the question is essentially the same if the problem is purely intragen-
erational, involving a generation's investments (in the private or pub-
lic sector) for its own future benefit.
C. Endogeneity
Until now, the market interest rate was taken to be fixed. Its level,
however, may be influenced by intergenerational policies. For exam-
ple, if the current generation consumes more, saving less privately and
running up a larger public debt, interest rates will tend to be higher.-
Indeed, this point is merely a special case of the phenomenon dis-
cussed in Part III.A that prices depend on the distribution of income
since, as previously noted, the market interest rate is one such price.
This interdependency, however, has no impact on the analysis
thus far. As described previously, the fact that the efficient outcome
may depend on the distribution does not disrupt the argument that
the choice among projects, once a distribution is chosen, should be
made on grounds of efficiency. Moreover, as emphasized in much of
Part II, the present analysis ordinarily takes the intergenerational dis-
tribution to be held constant. To the extent this is so, then the market
interest rate is indeed constant. (And, even if it were not, few projects
67 Note further that the break-even investment for the government would be one that paid
the full, pre-tax rate of return, not one that paid the lower, after-tax return. Although only an
amount reflecting the after-tax return would have to be bestowed on individuals to equal the
return that they would realize on equivalent savings, the remaining amount (the difference be-
tween the before- and after-tax return) would be required to cover the forgone tax proceeds.
(The difference between the before- and after-tax return is simply the tax levy on the return, and
this amount no longer flows into the government fisc on account of individuals' reduction in
savings.) In addition, the same logic applies to debt finance, considered in note 65. Public debt
would have to be offered at the full, pre-tax rate of return; otherwise, individuals would not
choose to hold it. (The debt could be offered at the after-tax interest rate if such interest were tax
exempt; however, what the government would save on interest payments would be fully offset by
what the government would lose from tax on the interest.) Therefore, the public project would
need to earn that rate of return to be sufficient to finance repayment of the debt (with interest).
68 In a small, open economy, world capital markets fix the interest rate. For large econo-
mies like the United States, domestic activities may influence the interest rate; likewise, if there is
an intergenerational shift worldwide, interests rates will change. Additionally, in practice domes-
tic interest rates are not entirely determined by world markets. See Martin Feldstein and Charles
Horioka, Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows, 90 Econ J 314 (1980); Maurice
Obstfeld, International Capital Mobility in the 1990s, in Peter B. Kenen, ed, Understanding Inter-
dependence: The Macroeconomics of the Open Economy 201 (Princeton 1995).
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would be of such a scope to have a substantial impact on the interest
rate, one sufficient to influence significantly which projects should be
undertaken.")
A subtle complication is that the chosen mix of projects also
could influence interest rates. For example, spending more on infra-
structure or on certain types of research and development might in-
crease the market return to private investment, bidding up interest
rates. Contrariwise, devoting more of the resources dedicated to benefit
future generations to environmental preservation might reduce the
market return. In any case, it remains true that the effects of shifting a
few projects (short of radical, worldwide shifts) are likely to be very
small, and whatever they may be, projects should be assessed on effi-
ciency grounds in terms of whatever interest rate actually will prevail. 7
V. MARKET INTEREST RATE VERSUS EXPLICIT
SOCIAL WEIGHTINGS
Many economists ground their view toward the discounting of
dollars by asking explicitly how society should weight dollars in dif-
ferent time periods. Under this approach, the social discount rate on
dollars is the sum of two components. The first is a pure rate of time
preference, indicating how units of utility should be compared across
periods. (For those who believe utility should not be discounted, this
component would be set equal to zero.) The second involves the con-
version of dollars to utility in different time periods.7' It is ordinarily
expressed as the product of rate of growth of per capita consumption
and the rate at which marginal utility declines with consumption (ex-
pressed as a positive term). The intuition behind the latter component
relates to the analysis in Part III.C: the richer (or, if the growth rate is
negative, poorer) are future generations relative to the present, and
the faster is the decline in marginal utility as the standard of living
increases, the less valuable is a future dollar compared to a present
dollar, from a social point of view.7
69 A very small change in interest rates would typically have a very small impact on the
optimal extent to which a project should be carried out.
70 In this respect too, the interest rate can be viewed as just another price. For example, if
more is spent on roads, the demand for concrete would be higher, which may cause its price to
rise, which will have a feedback effect on what mix of projects is efficient.
71 See, for example, Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity at 130 (cited in note 2); Geoffrey M.
Heal, Intertemporal Welfare Economics and the Environment, in Karl-Goran Maler and Jeffrey
R. Vincent, eds, 3 Handbook of Environmental Economics 1105 (Elsevier 2005) (which also
includes a third component reflecting how the marginal utility of consumption is affected by the
stock of environmental assets); Geoffrey Heal, Discounting:A Review of the Basic Economics, 74
U Chi L Rev 59 (2007).
72 Consider also the caveats noted in Part III.C.
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This approach to discounting dollars makes no reference to the
market rate of interest, yet is generally regarded to be at least roughly
consistent with using it. The reasoning makes reference to the optimi-
zation process. In perfect markets (including a lack of distortions such
as from taxation), the socially optimal mix of investments and distri-
bution of consumption across generations leads these two measures to
be equal. As the efficiency analysis in Part II indicates, any investment
mix that does not equate returns of all projects (private or public) at
the margin is inefficient; moves in the direction of efficiency allow all
generations to be made better off.
Moreover, at the optimal distribution, the market rate of return
and social rate of tradeoff of dollars across time will be equated. To
see this point, suppose that it were not so. For example, suppose as
before that one dollar invested by the present generation will yield the
market return of R, leaving 1 + R dollars for a future generation. And
suppose further that one dollar in the present generation is socially
valued as equivalent to 1 + S dollars in that future generation. If R > S,
then an additional dollar of investment should be made, as it will yield
1 + R to the future generation, which by assumption exceeds 1 + S and
thus is deemed more socially valuable than the one dollar given up by
the present generation. Note that, as more is invested, two changes
will occur. R will fall because, as more investment is made, the mar-
ginal return to investment falls.'3 In addition, S will rise because, as
consumption in the future increases relative to that in the present, the
marginal social value of consumption in the future falls and that in the
present rises, so it will take more than the original 1 + S dollars in the
future to be equivalent to one dollar in the present. As investment is
increased, eventually R and S will be equated. (Similar analysis applies
to the case in which R < S initially.)
The foregoing discussion also implies, however, that the criterion
of basing project (social investment) decisions on the market interest
rate will differ from that of basing decisions on explicit social prefer-
ences when not at the distributive optimum. Which principle is correct
in that case? The answer can best be understood by reference to the
analysis in Part II.D, in which distribution was held constant, and that
in Part II.E.3, in which non-distribution-neutral reforms were ana-
lyzed explicitly.
If in fact a project will be implemented in a distribution-neutral
fashion (taking tax and other adjustments into account), then use of
73 This effect recalls the point in Part 1V.C that the market interest rate is endogenous
because it depends on the intergenerational distribution. See also the qualification in note 68 on
the effect of world capital markets on the interest rate.
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the market interest rate is correct, as indicated previously. Actually,
upon reflection, the explicit social preference approach would, if prop-
erly interpreted (adjusted), reach the same result. After all, if distribu-
tion is held constant, then the project does not involve relative changes
in levels of dollars in the present and future, so the social weightings
would be inapplicable. More precisely, if the reform is efficient and the
benefits are shared across generations, there are only gains to discount, so
the outcome will be favorable; likewise, an inefficient project under
distribution neutrality would produce losses to all generations, so a
socially weighted sum would be unambiguously negative.
A possible danger arises when a project on its face is not distribu-
tion neutral (many are not), leading it to be analyzed with the socially
weighted approach, even though there will be other adjustments to
the system, such as to taxes and debt in order to finance the project,
that produce a distributive offset, the effects of which are not explic-
itly incorporated in the analysis.74 If, as Part II.E.3 suggests, there is
some tendency for whatever intergenerational distributive political
equilibrium exists to prevail, then deviating from the market approach
may well be incorrect. Furthermore, as previously discussed, if there is
not distribution-neutral implementation, the second step of the pro-
posed decomposition -isolating the redistributive feature -generally
raises a distribution-distortion tradeoff, the primary distortion being of
labor supply (as discussed in Part II.E.1). Placing social weights on dol-
lar transfers while failing to analyze the tradeoff explicitly is tanta-
mount to counting distribution while ignoring distortion, which also
would produce misleading prescriptions.5
74 The problem is analogous to the use of distributive weights in intragenerational cost-
benefit analysis when the costs and benefits that are weighted are those of the project (viewed
narrowly), ignoring how the project is to be financed.
75 As Part II.E.1 notes, over the past few decades a substantial "second-best" literature in
economics focusing on distortionary effects has emerged. There appears to be no analogue to
this development regarding intergenerational applications of cost-benefit analysis. Fortunately,
as Parts II.D and II.E indicate, a single unifying framework applies readily to both contexts;
specifically, the approach developed in more recent work applicable (implicitly) to the problems
of intragenerational public goods and the regulation of externalities, regarding both distribution
and distortion, extends readily to the intergenerational version of these problems.
A further, related point is that much prior economic literature, for example, most of that dis-
cussed in Arrow, et al, Intertemporal Equity (cited in note 2), builds on variations of what is
referred to as the Ramsey model of taxation in which there is a representative individual (in the
present setting, for each generation), which rules out (intragenerational) income differences, and
a standard labor income tax is disallowed (despite its prevalence in developed economies). As
discussed by Atkinson and Stiglitz, 6 J Pub Econ 55 (cited in note 12), and elaborated in Kaplow,
The Theory of Taxation and Public Economics (cited in note 12), and Kaplow, 90 J Pub Econ
1235 (cited in note 12), the principal results associated with such models are replaced by qualita-
tively different ones along the lines presented in Parts II.D and II.E once one shifts to a frame-
work with income differences and redistributive income taxation.
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The greatest potential shortcoming of using explicit social weight-
ings is precisely the core idea identified throughout Part II: the method
results in the inefficient selection of projects, which may come at the
expense of every generation. Specifically, projects may be deemed so-
cially desirable under this approach even when they are inefficient, as
long as they implicitly produce a sufficient intergenerational distribu-
tive gain. Whenever that is the case, however, it would be better to
shelve such projects and instead implement alternatives (including, no-
tably, direct forms of intergenerational redistribution, such as through
debt policy) that produce the same distributive gain without the direct
efficiency cost from the project per se. Likewise, some projects that
fail under the explicit weightings approach will be efficient and thus
could be implemented with appropriate distributive offsets so as to
benefit all generations. Both of these cases are obscured when differ-
ent types of effects, some distinctive to the project and some not, are
commingled under a unitary, all-things-considered assessment.
Use of explicit social weightings fails to separate questions of
intergenerational efficiency and distribution. As just suggested, this
failure can generate mistaken conclusions. Also of great importance,
analysis becomes more complicated and is made more obscure. To
properly use social weightings assumes that, for any project, one can
identify the long-run distributive effect (that is, how the intergenera-
tional distributive political equilibrium is likely to be altered, if at all),
decide on the proper social weightings, and analyze the tradeoff with
distortion -all in addition to the often formidable task of determining
the direct costs and benefits of the project itself. As suggested previ-
ously, there are considerable advantages from specialization if these
two sets of inquiries are separated. Furthermore, it seems plausible
that greater clarity can be achieved, both among academic and other
professional analysts and when the analysts attempt to communicate
the results of their work to policymakers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The core of this Article elaborates the thesis that intergenera-
tional distributive justice and efficiency are largely distinct. This ar-
gument was developed from a number of complementary perspec-
tives, many of which employed constructs that held the intergenera-
tional distribution of resources constant. For the most part, it does not
matter whether that given distribution constitutes a normative ideal in
one or another sense, an equilibrium that results from extant political
forces, or any other, even arbitrary, allocation.
Also examined were a variety of additional factors, including dis-
tortionary effects of redistribution, heterogeneity of preferences,
feedbacks from distribution to efficiency, and complications relating to
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the market interest rate at which dollars are discounted. These consid-
erations do not materially alter the central conclusion. Nor do most of
them raise questions that are distinctive to the intergenerational set-
ting. Taken together, the analysis suggests that accepted principles of
policy analysis developed in the intragenerational context carry over.
Indeed, some complexities are purely intragenerational; that is, they
influence analysis within each of the generations affected by policies
but do not create any distinctive challenges along the intergenera-
tional dimension.
Although no particular normative view was adopted concerning
intergenerational distributive justice, much of the analysis employed a
welfarist framework that, as the introduction notes, assesses policies
exclusively by reference to their effects on individuals' well-being. A
few words are in order about other normative perspectives.
First, because much of the analysis held distribution constant, one
might suppose that a variety of views on distributive justice would be
consistent with the present argument. This suggestion is not necessar-
ily correct, however, since the very meaning of constant distribution
was taken here to be denominated in terms of individuals' well-being.6
If instead individuals' positions were assessed by some other metric,
such as Rawls's primary goods or Sen's capabilities and functionings,
the analysis could differ."
Second, the analysis demonstrated that efficient policies with
intergenerational consequences could be implemented in a fashion
that makes everyone better off, that is, constitutes a Pareto improve-
ment.'8 Hence, the adoption of other distributive notions, notably, non-
welfarist ones, entails acceptance of the social desirability of making
everyone worse off if indeed the notions' prescriptions materially dif-
fer. 9 This stance seems difficult to defend and, moreover, inconsistent
76 See especially the more precise formulation of distribution neutrality in Part ll.D.
77 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice 90-95 (cited in note 2); John Rawls, Social Unity and
Primary Goods, in Sen and Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond 159 (cited in note 3); Amar-
tya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities (North-Holland 1985); Amartya Sen, Well-Being, Agency
and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984, 82 J Phil 169 (1985). For a critique, including in particu-
lar the point that these approaches conflict with the Pareto principle and plausible notions of
freedom and autonomy, see Louis Kaplow, Primary Good.% Capabilities... or Well-Being? (un-
published manuscript 2006).
78 The primary caveat, concerning heterogeneity within income groups within the same
generation (see Part II.E.2), seems tangential to most imaginable notions of intergenerational
distributive justice since the differences are purely intragenerational.
79 This is an application of the more general point that nonwelfarist principles violate the
Pareto principle. See Kaplow and Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare (cited in note 3); Louis Kap-
low and Steven Shavell, Any Non-Welfarist Method of Policy Assessment Violates the Pareto
Principle, 109 J Polit Econ 281 (2001); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, The Conflict Between
Notions of Fairness and the Pareto Principle, 1 Am Law & Econ Rev 63 (1999).
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with typical appeals concerning intergenerational distributive justice.
Regarding the latter, appeals of just savings, sustainability, leaving as
good for those who come later, and so forth explicitly contemplate
that the requisite sacrifices by the present generation are to benefit
some or all future generations. If, however, those generations to whom
obligations are owed are hurt rather than helped, the positions become
difficult to comprehend. An important possibility is that seemingly
nonwelfarist moral intuitions about what is due to future generations
are implicitly surrogates for directing sufficient concern toward those
generations' welfare.
The most obvious exceptions to this point are those views that,
for example, endow the natural environment with independent nor-
mative significance. Such objectives require a different analysis, al-
though one that should possess many similarities with that presented
here. For example, however nature and well-being are to be traded off,
one could better advance both objectives by adopting more efficient
policies. That is, both preservation and well-being should be advanced
in the most efficient fashion possible, which requires employing a con-
stant rate of tradeoff between the two across policies. Where the
present analysis took the intergenerational distribution of well-being as
given, one could also hold constant natural protection, asking what mix
of policies was most efficient in the manner described herein.81
As a final, related note, observe that if a welfarist notion of inter-
generational distributive justice is adopted, there is nothing a priori
special about environmental protection, conservation of resources, or
any other particular manner by which a present generation may affect
future generations. All that matters is how one or another regime will
affect subsequent individuals' well-being. It may be that due to the
increasing marginal harm caused by certain forms of environmental
degradation, the existence of irreversibilities, and certain forms of un-
certainty, efficiency requires that a great deal of investment be made
to preserve the environment. The extent to which this is true and, just
as important, which investments are required should be determined
by considerations of efficiency, once a principle governing intergen-
erational distributive justice is adopted. Such a distributive principle, it
should be emphasized, would (at least in a welfarist framework) be
80 This point is equally applicable to principles designed to limit the sacrifices required by
the present generation.
81 To even define such a view, it would be necessary to reduce relevant features of the natural
environment to a common denominator-equivalently, to state how different traits should be
traded off-unless one literally required that every aspect of nature remain unchanged (which
seems infeasible and is difficult to define due to the need to specify a benchmark and the fact that
evolution is part of nature).
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the same even if it so happened that the course of the natural environ-
ment were entirely unaffected by human activity-for example, if the
only decision to be made was how to allocate a single resource between
consumption by the present generation and investment for the benefit
of future generations.
